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Abstract
This article describes a systematic analysis of the relationship between empirical
data and theoretical conclusions for a set of experimental psychology articles
published in the journal Science between 2005–2012. When the success rate of a
set of empirical studies is much higher than would be expected relative to the
experiments’ reported effects and sample sizes, it suggests that null findings have
been suppressed, that the experiments or analyses were inappropriate, or that the
theory does not properly follow from the data. The analyses herein indicate such
excess success for 83% (15 out of 18) of the articles in Science that report four or
more studies and contain sufficient information for the analysis. This result
suggests a systematic pattern of excess success among psychology articles in the
journal Science.
Introduction
Unbelievable discoveries [1], important experimental findings that fail to replicate
[2], [3], fraudulent data [4], [5], and awareness that researchers might use
questionable research practices to produce significant findings [6], [7] have
contributed to concerns that psychology cannot be trusted to produce valid
scientific work [8–10]. Even though fraud may be rare, researchers may re-run
experiments, drop subjects, selectively merge data from different experiments,
suppress null findings, drop experimental conditions, or round down p values in
order to report statistical significance. Such practices bias the experimental
outcomes, undermine the credibility of the theoretical conclusions that are
derived from the published experimental data, and leave a statistical trace that can
be identified across multiple experiments with the Test for Excess Significance
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(TES) [11]. Broadly speaking, the TES estimates the probability that a set of
experiments with proper sampling, appropriate analyses, and full reporting will
produce at least as many ‘‘successful’’ outcomes as have actually been observed. If
this probability is small, it suggests that researchers should doubt the assumptions
of appropriate sampling, proper analysis, and complete reporting. We describe the
details of the TES below.
Recent investigations using the TES [12–21] have indicated that some articles
and meta-analyses in the field of psychological science appear to be biased, which
suggests that scientists should be skeptical about the claims in those articles and
meta-analyses. Since those TES analyses focused on specific articles rather than a
representative sample of articles, they do not allow for generalization to the
broader field. It is difficult to create a random sample from published articles, and
such a sample may not be especially meaningful because a seminal paper may
motivate many investigations while a randomly selected paper may have little
impact. Francis [22] partly addressed this issue by investigating all possible articles
in the prominent journal Psychological Science over a four-year span. In that
analysis, 82% of investigated articles (36 out of 44) failed the TES analysis. Here
we apply the same systematic analysis to articles published in the highly influential
journal Science over an eight-year span. We investigated the journal Science
because it is widely recognized as being one of the most important scientific
journals. We restricted our analysis to papers related to psychology and education
because, as described below, the TES analysis requires some subject-matter
expertise to be able to interpret the presented statistical findings. The current
authors have such expertise for psychology and education but will have to leave a
similar analysis for fields such as biology or medicine to other subject-matter
experts.
The Test for Excess Success
Across a series of hypothesis tests some unknown subset of the tests will result in
errors, either by rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true (a Type I error) or by
failing to reject the null when it is false (a Type II error). Random sampling
ensures that such errors will sometimes occur even under ideal experimental
conditions. Null hypothesis significance testing provides a way to control the Type
I and Type II error rates; for example, setting the Type I error rate at 0.05 implies
that one will mistakenly reject the null hypothesis for 5% of those studies where
the null hypothesis is true. Under non-ideal conditions, such as when model
assumptions required by the statistical tests are not met, the Type I error rate can
be much larger than the intended 5%. Moreover, this nominal error rate depends
upon the data having been properly sampled, analyzed, and reported.
Improper sampling, analysis, or reporting is difficult to identify in any single
study, but such behaviors leave a detectable pattern across a set of experiments.
Ioannidis and Trikalinos [11] proposed a ‘‘test for excess significance’’ (TES) that
compares estimates of experimental power with the reported frequency of
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significant outcomes. For our analyses, we slightly extend the TES to encompass
‘‘excess success’’ rather than only excess significance.
The definition of ‘‘success’’ differs across experiments. In many experiments a
successful outcome is to reject the null hypothesis (typically defined as p#0.05), in
which case the probability of success corresponds to a calculation of experimental
power. In other experiments a successful outcome is to not reject the null
hypothesis, in which case the success probability is the complement of power.
Finally, an experiment’s success is sometimes based on a pattern of significant and
non-significant hypothesis tests that contrast different aspects of the data.
Regardless of the definition of success, a set of experiments with properly gathered
data, and results that are appropriately analyzed and fully reported, should
produce successful outcomes at a rate consistent with the experiments’ estimated
success probabilities [11], [15], [18], [21]. Too much success suggests that the
reported results are biased in favor of the theoretical claims.
The logic of the TES is similar to standard approaches in hypothesis testing. We
start by supposing proper data collection and analysis for each experiment along
with full reporting of all experimental outcomes related to the theoretical ideas.
Such suppositions are similar to the null hypothesis in standard hypothesis
testing. We then identify the magnitude of the reported effects and estimate the
probability of success for experiments like those reported. Finally, we compute a
joint success probability, PTES, across the full set of experiments, which estimates
the probability that experiments like the ones reported would produce outcomes
at least as successful as those actually reported. When the reported experiments
are uniformly successful, PTES estimates the probability that direct replications of
the experiments will all be successful. The PTES value plays a role similar to the p
value in standard hypothesis testing, with a small PTES suggesting that the starting
suppositions are not entirely correct and that, instead, there appears to be a
problem with data collection, analysis, or publication of relevant findings. In
essence, if PTES is small, then the published findings in an article appear to be ‘‘too
good to be true’’ relative to the theoretical claims. A common criterion for PTES
being small is 0.1 [11], [12], [23]. Given scientific interest in reproducibility, a
probability of 0.1 seems like a very modest criterion for success across experiments
that support theoretical claims; most scientists would probably want their
theoretical claims to be based on experiments with much more reliable outcomes.
While it is not the case that the theoretical claims derived from experiments with
excess success are necessarily (or entirely) wrong, the evidence for these claims is,
at best, weaker than it first appears.
To explain the TES analysis without emphasizing any particular article, Table 1
describes the relevant statistics and hypotheses for five reported experiments that
are taken from five different articles in Science and artificially brought together.
The TES conclusion here will not be meaningful because these experiments do not
promote a common theoretical claim, but the discussion helps to demonstrate the
types of issues that appear when doing a TES analysis. The original authors
reported the hypotheses listed in Table 1 as supporting their theoretical claims.
Because ‘‘success’’ sometimes includes a complex set of both significant and non-
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significant outcomes, the estimation of success probability is often more
complicated than a standard power analysis. Moreover, sometimes an article does
not report sufficient statistical detail to fully estimate the success probabilities. In
such cases, we always estimate an upper limit on the probabilities, which favors an
interpretation that the articles are valid.
Experiment 1 measured the correlation between a dependent variable and each
of three related measures of another variable. The probability of a significant
outcome for each test by itself is estimated with post hoc power calculations [24],
which suppose that the population correlation is the value observed in the sample.
(Post hoc power is sometimes inappropriately used as an estimated probability of
an already observed experimental outcome, but we use it here as an estimate of
success probabilities for the outcome of replication studies.) Because these
outcomes are correlated, estimating the joint probability for all three observed
significant outcomes would require access to the raw data. Since the probability of
all three outcomes being significant must be less than the probability of any one of
the outcomes, the test with the smallest success probability provides an estimated
upper bound for the set. This estimated probability is a bit over one-half, and
Table 1 lists it as the joint probability for Experiment 1.
Table 1. Statistical properties, hypotheses, and estimated probabilities of success for a set of five experiments.
Statistics Hypotheses
Probability of
success
Exp. 1 n5179 r1 ? 0 0.844
r1520.22 r2 ? 0 0.518
r2520.15 r3 ? 0 0.675
r3520.18 Joint 0.518
Exp. 2 n1517, n2517, n3518 ANOVA 0.684
X15316, X25305, X35186 m1 ? m3 0.696
s5152 m2 ? m3 0.620
m1 5 m2 0.946
Joint 0.482
Exp. 3 n1518, n2518
X155.16,X253.47 m1 ? m2 0.517
s52.85
Exp. 4 n1528, n2526 mX1 ? mX2 0.495
FX 54.08, FY 54.40 mY1 ? mY2 0.528
rXY 50.36 Joint 0.318
Exp. 5 n1A517, n2A517, n1B517, n2B517 Interaction 0.916
X1A53.87, X1B57.00 m1A ? m1B 0.681
X2A57.59, X2B54.28 m2A ? m2B 0.635
s53.91 Joint 0.438
PTES 0.018
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0114255.t001
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Experiment 2 used a between-subjects design with three conditions. The
authors supported their theoretical claims with a statistical analysis that included a
significant omnibus ANOVA and significant contrasts between a control and each
of the two experimental conditions. Any difference between the two experimental
conditions was predicted to be non-significant. These tests are not independent,
so we estimated the probability of success by the Monte Carlo method. We
simulated 100,000 experiments that drew samples from normally distributed
populations using the means and standard deviations derived from the sample
statistics. Our simulations found that only the predicted non-significant outcome
has a high probability of success. Moreover, the joint probability of all tests
producing a successful outcome is less than one-half because it is uncommon for a
set of random samples to satisfy so many constraints on the outcomes.
Experiment 3 compared ratings across two priming conditions with a two-
sample t-test. The test produced only a ‘‘marginally significant’’ result (p50.09),
but this was judged by the original authors as sufficient evidence to support their
theoretical claim. To be consistent with the original authors, the success
probability was based on a significance criterion of 0.1.
Experiment 4 reported two behavioral measures from two samples of
participants that were exposed to different conditions. A successful outcome
relative to the theory required both measures to show a significant difference. The
summary statistics did not fully report the means and standard deviations of the
measures, so Table 1 lists the relevant F values for the tests. The article reported
the correlation between the measures, so we estimated the probability of success
by the Monte Carlo method with 100,000 simulated experiments that took
samples from populations using the correlation and standardized means, which
we derived from the F values. The success probability for each individual test is
close to one-half, but the probability of both outcomes being significant is closer
to one-third. Similar to Experiment 2, the multiple constraints on the definition
of success reduce the joint probability.
Experiment 5 used a two-by-two between-subjects design and predicted a
significant interaction and significant contrasts across each of two pairs of
conditions. We estimated the probabilities of these outcomes with simulated
experiments that used the reported means and estimated standard deviations. We
derived the latter from the reported F values because the reported standard
deviations were inconsistent with the reported F values. Although the interaction
has a high success probability, the joint success probability is low because the
particular type of interaction required by the theoretical claims is fairly
uncommon.
The italicized success probability for each experiment in Table 1 indicates the
joint probability for all of the required outcomes for that experiment. The
estimated probability that five experiments like these would all produce successful
outcomes is the product of the five joint probabilities, PTES50.018. This
probability indicates that entirely successful outcomes across all of these
experiments should be very rare for unbiased experiments. Had these experiments
been reported together, in a single paper, to support a set of related theoretical
Excess Success for Psychology in Science
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claims, then such a low probability would indicate that readers should be skeptical
that the data were gathered properly, that the analyses were appropriate, or that all
relevant experimental findings were fully reported. Note that this skepticism
would not mean that the theoretical claims were wrong, only that such claims
were unsubstantiated by the analyses of the current set of experiments. This
skepticism also would not necessarily indicate that any of the experimental results
were invalid, because the TES analysis can only identify a problem across the set. It
could be that all of the reported experiments were valid but that unsuccessful valid
experiments were not reported. Such unsuccessful experiments might undermine
the authors’ theoretical claims. Alternatively, the reported experiments might be
invalid by themselves because of inappropriate sampling or analysis.
Applying the TES Analysis to Articles in Science
From the Science journal’s on-line collection, we downloaded all 133 original
research articles (and their supplementary material) that were classified as
Psychology or Education for years 2005–2012. We then checked each article and
its supplementary material to determine if the article contained four or more
studies, a condition required to provide sufficient power to conduct a TES
analysis [18]. We identified 25 such articles classified as Psychology and one such
article classified as Education.
We further examined each of these 26 articles to see if the article and its
supplementary material provided sufficient detail to perform a TES analysis. Eight
articles did not include sufficient detail to compute success probabilities for at
least four studies and were thus excluded from the TES analysis. Information S1
lists the eight excluded articles and the reasons for their exclusion. The supporting
information also provides a full description of the TES analysis for each of the
included articles [25–42] (Information S1) and provides R source code
(Information S2) for estimating success probabilities with Monte Carlo
simulations for complicated experimental designs.
Results and Discussion
Table 2 lists the PTES value for each of the 18 analyzed articles. For 15 of these
articles, the probability of the observed experimental outcome is below the 0.1
criterion for excess success. Thus, 83% of the articles in Table 2 make theoretical
claims based on experimental results that appear to be too good to be true given a
weak requirement for estimated reproducibility. This 83% apparent bias rate is
especially troubling because the journal Science publishes studies that are widely
considered to be among the best and most influential in the field. If the work
published in Science is flawed, then either the entire field is suspect or the journal
Science does not actually reflect the field’s best work and its influence is
unwarranted.
Excess Success for Psychology in Science
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It remains an open question whether the 83% excess success rate generalizes to
studies in Science with fewer than four studies. On the one hand, papers with
fewer studies may be based on more convincing experimental results (e.g., larger
sample sizes), which might indicate that the 83% rate should not apply to such
papers. On the other hand, it seems unfair to suppose that scientists would lower
their standards for papers with four or more experiments, which suggests that the
same problems that produce the 83% rate would also apply to other papers.
Another open question, to which similar considerations apply, is whether the
excess success rate for Science generalizes to other journals. It could be that
journals that impose different publication criteria than Science end up publishing
more convincing experimental results, but it would be ironic if scientists’ most
valid work was published in ‘‘secondary’’ outlets. Furthermore, the excess success
rate in Science is similar to the reported excess success rate in Psychological Science
(82%), where the only other systematic TES analysis of psychology articles has
been applied [22].
Two of the articles listed in Table 2 deserve special discussion. One of the
articles has been retracted due to Stapel’s fraudulent research practices [4], [39].
The TES analysis is not designed to detect fraudulent data, because a
knowledgeable fraudster can always craft data that pass the test and produce a
seemingly convincing scientific argument. Although Stapel remains responsible
for his fraud, knowledgeable researchers in the field could have identified that his
reported findings were too good to be true (PTES50.075). Likewise, when evidence
of fraud was levied against Marc Hauser in other publications, his article in Science
Table 2. Results of the TES analysis for each of eighteen articles in Science.
Year Authors Short title PTES
2006 Dijksterhuis et al. [25] Deliberation-Without-Attention Effect 0.051
2006 Vohs et al. [26] Psychological Consequences of Money 0.002
2006 Zhong & Lijenquist [27] Washing Away Your Sins 0.095
2007 Wood et al. [28] Perception of Goal-Directed Action in Primates 0.031
2008 Whitson & Galinsky [29] Lacking Control Increases Illusory Pattern Perception 0.008
2009 Mehta & Zhu [30] Effect of Color on Cognitive Performance 0.002
2009 Paukner et al. [31] Monkeys Display Affiliation Toward Imitators 0.037
2009 Weisbuch et al. [32] Race Bias via Televised Nonverbal Behavior 0.027
2010 Ackerman et al. [33] Incidental Haptic Sensations Influence Decisions 0.017
2010 Bahrami et al. [34] Optimally Interacting Minds 0.332
2010 Kova´cs et al. [35] Susceptibility to Others’ Beliefs in Infants and Adults 0.021
2010 Morewedge et al. [36] Imagined Consumption Reduces Actual Consumption 0.012
2011 Halperine et al. [37] Promoting the Middle East Peace Process 0.210
2011 Ramirez & Beilock [38] Writing About Worries Boosts Exam Performance 0.059
2011 Stapel & Lindenberg [39] Disordered Contexts Promote Stereotyping 0.075
2012 Gervais & Norenzayan [40] Analytic Thinking Promotes Religious Disbelief 0.051
2012 Seeley et al. [41] Stop Signals Provide Inhibition in Honeybee Swarms 0.957
2012 Shah et al. [42] Some Consequences of Having Too Little 0.091
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0114255.t002
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[28] was suspected of improper data collection. The article was subsequently
‘‘cleared’’ by a replication experiment, but the originally published data seem too
good to be true (PTES50.051), and the subsequent successful replication made the
full set of findings even less believable (PTES50.031).
Although many of the concerns about research practices have focused on
articles from social psychology, Table 2 demonstrates that some studies from
educational psychology [38], developmental psychology [35], and primate
behavior [28], [31] have similar problems.
The bias across the studies in Table 2 must be severe because simulation studies
of the performance of the TES analysis [15], [18] demonstrate that the test is
conservative, in the sense that truly proper experiment sets rarely produce PTES
values below the 0.1 criterion. When a set of unbiased experiments all happen to
produce a significant effect, such experiments also tend to give large estimated
power values and thereby produce a large PTES value. If the true power is small, it
is unusual for all of the experiments to produce a significant outcome, but it is
even more unusual for such experiments to have small estimated power values.
For unbiased experiment sets, the true Type I error rate for concluding bias
(reporting bias that does not exist) is often close to 0.01 even when using the
nominal 0.1 criterion. Furthermore, when only a file-drawer bias exists (running
proper experiments but suppressing unsuccessful findings), the test often fails to
detect the bias because inflated effect size estimates from the biased set of
published experiments lead to overestimated success probabilities. Thus, the high
rate of bias detected in Table 2 is unlikely to be produced only by the suppression
of null findings. Instead, it seems that multiple forms of bias were applied to the
articles in Science. It seems plausible that researchers often tweak their datasets or
analyses to produce p values just below 0.05 and also reinterpret or suppress
findings when they produce p values that cannot be forced below the significance
criterion [43].
Problems with Scientific Practice in Psychology
The TES analyses in Table 2 paint a worrying picture of the psychology research
that is published in the journal Science. However, as noted previously, this does
not necessarily imply that the authors of apparently biased articles intentionally
misled readers. This section discusses how four scientific principles can be easily
misapplied and how those misapplications tend to produce experimental results
with excess success. This discussion is not intended to be exhaustive or entirely
novel, but it tries to focus on issues that might explain the findings in Table 2.
Replication Does Not Necessarily Establish Scientific Truth
Successful replication is widely considered to be the gold standard of empirical
scientific investigations. However, the role of replication in a field such as
psychology is complicated because successful outcomes are based on statistics. A
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successful experiment in psychology is generally one that rejects the null
hypothesis, but a key lesson from the TES analysis is that the rate of successful
replication must reflect the power of the experiments. Having experiments with
moderate or low power consistently reject the null hypothesis is cause for concern
rather than celebration. For many of the articles in Table 2, reporting one or two
unsuccessful but theoretically relevant experimental results would have blunted
the TES analysis. Of course, even though reporting unsuccessful experimental
outcomes may remove the appearance of bias, it may not strengthen the argument
for the theoretical conclusion because the unsuccessful outcomes may contradict
the theory.
Not every experiment is methodologically sound, and some experiments (even
if methodologically sound) do not clarify the status of a theoretical idea. There is
little reason to publish such experimental results, whether they are statistically
significant or not. Unfortunately, in day-to-day scientific practice it is quite easy
to interpret an unsuccessful outcome as being irrelevant to the theory or as being
methodologically flawed and therefore not worth reporting. Such an attitude may
reflect the conventional wisdom that non-significant results do not provide useful
information because it is not possible to prove the null. Although there is truth to
that conventional wisdom, reporting only significant outcomes misrepresents the
magnitude of effects and can make even true null effects appear to be non-zero. In
a variation of this approach, researchers may abort experiments that appear to not
be working and instead focus resources elsewhere. A researcher who suppresses
such an incomplete experimental result can honestly say that they do not know
what would happen for a completed experiment; but if only seemingly successful
experiments are run to completion, then the resulting findings are almost surely
biased. A set of such experiments will tend to have an excess of success.
Gathering More Data is Not Always Better
Statistical inference almost always improves with larger samples, which suggests
that researchers using hypothesis testing will improve their conclusions by
increasing sample sizes. Although unclear results should motivate scientists to
gather more data and thereby reveal the truth, this idea does not work well in
psychological science because the standard logic of frequentist hypothesis testing
is valid only when the sample size is fixed prior to analysing data.
Despite this limitation in hypothesis testing, a common request by reviewers
and editors is for authors to add more participants and see if a weak (say, p50.07)
result might become significant. Reviewers almost never request that authors add
more participants to see if data with a moderate (say, p50.03) result might
become non-significant. Over multiple experiments, these requests, or similar
‘‘optional stopping’’ by authors, produce a bias that exaggerates effect sizes and
replication rates of measured effects [44–46]. Gathering additional data can lead
to misleading p values, because the Type I error rate increases rapidly with
additional tests.
Excess Success for Psychology in Science
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An experiment that stops as soon as it finds a significant result tends to produce
p values that are just below the significance criterion. Indeed, for many of the
studies in Table 2, relevant significant outcomes have p values just below 0.05
[43], which tends to produce a set of experiments with excess success.
The Data Should Not Always Define the Theory
A principle tenet of science is that a theory must change (or be rejected) to reflect
new data. The principle is true, but if the precision of empirical measurements is
poor, then theories defined by the data statistics largely reflect noise.
Consider the precision of the measured effects reported by Gervais and
Norenzayan [40], which is representative of many of the articles in Table 2.
Figure 1 characterizes the 95% confidence interval [47] for each experiment’s
standardized effect size (Hedges’ g). The confidence intervals around these effect
size estimates stretch from almost zero to above 1.2. The breadth of these
confidence intervals indicates that most of the experiments give little clarity about
the true size of the measured effects. A theory that perfectly matches the mean
data may be the best fit by conventional statistical criteria (e.g., maximum
likelihood); but if the data are noisy then a best-fitting theory is not necessarily a
good-fitting theory [48], [49]. When imprecise experimental results are pooled
together through meta-analysis or as converging evidence, they can constrain
theoretical ideas in important ways, but the validity of such pooling requires the
experiment set to be unbiased.
Confusion about the relationship between data and theory is also reflected in
what Kerr [50] called hypothesizing after the results are known (HARKing). Some
researchers are so fixated on the 0.05 criterion that they take any significant result
as something that should be included in a theory but judge any non-significant
finding as irrelevant to the theory or as identification of a boundary condition
(and thus part of the theory). Sometimes a theory that emerged from a dataset is
presented as if it predicted the dataset, which is clearly a misrepresentation of the
scientific process [51].
If many p values are close to the significance criterion, then HARKing will
produce theoretical claims with a high risk of being based on noise. A TES analysis
of such findings will often reveal excess success, reflecting the fact that an exact
replication would be unlikely to produce the same pattern of significant and non-
significant outcomes.
Not All Confirmed Predictions Support a Theory
Perhaps no outcome of science is more convincing than when a theory makes a
novel prediction that is verified by a new experiment. A common phrase in the
articles contributing to Table 2 goes something like, ‘‘as predicted by the theory,’’
which is then followed by the report of a successful hypothesis test. Such
verification of a prediction seems like strong validation of the theoretical ideas,
but the belief in this validation is sometimes unjustified. The outcome of a
Excess Success for Psychology in Science
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statistical hypothesis test varies across random samples, which implies that the
best any theoretical predictor can do is to estimate the probability of an
experimental outcome. If the predicted outcome is to reject the null, this
probability is power; and its estimation requires knowing an effect size, sample
size, and analysis design. None of the articles in Table 2 described a theoretically
motivated effect size, which means that the theories in those articles do not
actually predict the outcome of a hypothesis test (even probabilistically). Thus, the
consistently reported validation of theory predictions is actually a cause for
concern.
What may have happened for some of the articles listed in Table 2 is that the
authors had valid reasons to search for the existence of certain effects, but they did
not convert such ideas into quantitative predictions about the outcome of a
hypothesis test. Without a quantitative prediction, it is difficult to design an
experiment that can convincingly demonstrate a prediction failure [52]. Given
pressure to reduce costs, such experiments tend to be underpowered and thereby
produce outcomes that are difficult for researchers to interpret. In such situations,
experiments that happen to qualitatively match a predicted outcome may be given
undue credence, since the observed outcome is partially due to chance, even while
experiments that do not match a prediction are dismissed as being underpowered.
With inadequate tests of a prediction, a scientist may strongly feel that he or she is
following good scientific practice even while producing dubious support for their
theory. Mistakes in data collection, statistical analysis, or reporting of relevant
findings further magnify the discrepancy between a researcher’s belief in the
validity of a theoretical interpretation of the reported findings and the biased
properties of those findings.
Conclusions
Eighty-three percent of the Psychology/Education articles with four or more
experiments that were published in Science (2005–2012) have an excess of success,
which suggests that their results are too good to be true. Since scientists should be
skeptical about those articles’ theoretical claims, this high rate of bias is
Figure 1. The circles mark the standardized effect size for the key findings in five experiments [40].
Each horizontal line indicates the range of a 95% confidence interval for the effect size. The diameter of a
circle indicates the relative sample size of the experiment, with the largest sample size being 179.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0114255.g001
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disturbing. It is unlikely that psychology uniquely faces these problems, as
analyses suggest that at least some findings in neuroscience and medicine have
similar problems [53–55], and these concerns may also apply to other fields that
use statistics [56].
We would like to emphasize that the appearance of excess success does not
establish intentional misconduct by the authors of an article. Given the problems
identified above and in other discussions about statistics and publication practices
in psychology [6], [7], [10], [46], [50], [51], [57–59], we believe that the
appearance of excess success is often an honest mistake by authors who did not
appreciate the inherent variability that should appear in their hypothesis test
results. Such misunderstandings may lead to misinterpretations (e.g., concluding
that a non-significant outcome is irrelevant and need not be reported) or over-
interpretations (e.g., deriving a theory to match all reported outcomes) of
experimental findings; and these errors lead to poor theories and excess success.
In terms of reform, we see promise in an approach that advises exploratory
empirical work to focus on principles of estimation (e.g., [60–62]) and in a
complementary approach that advises formal methods for model development
and theory testing [59], [63], [64]. Discussions about empirical findings and
theories in the published literature are an integral part of the scientific process, so
we also see benefit to systems such as PubMed Commons and Pub Peer that
encourage such discussions and to systems such as the Open Science Framework
[65] that improve access to empirical data.
Overall, we believe that many of the current problems in psychology reflect
misunderstandings about how to draw theoretical conclusions from statistical
data. Moreover, we believe that these problems can be fixed and that psychological
scientists will be receptive to the solutions.
Supporting Information
Information S1. TES analyses for individual articles. This document provides a
full analysis of each article listed in Table 2. It also explains why some articles
could not be analyzed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0114255.s001 (PDF)
Information S2. TES analysis calculations. This compressed file contains a
directory for every article in Table 2. Each directory includes a text file describing
the location of the statistics taken from the article that were used for the TES
analysis. It also includes a spreadsheet that summarizes the statistics, computes
effect sizes (where appropriate), and lists the estimated success probability for
each experiment. The directory also includes any R source code that was used to
estimate success probability.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0114255.s002 (ZIP)
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